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Abstract 
Populism is generally defined (1) as the combination of people-centrism with political cynicism, (2) as 
anti-elitist and anti-pluralist, and (3) as ideologically ‘thin’. This definition largely borrows from popu-
lism supply research which focus on populist politicians, parties, and movements. However, little re-
search has investigated if this supply-definition of populism as a consistent set of ideas holds up in the 
general public (i.e., the demand side of politics). In this paper, we conduct an individual-level analysis 
of populist beliefs using data from Flanders (N = 1449) by analyzing how common people interrelate 
four political attitudes: people-centrism, political cynicism, elitism, and pluralism. Correlational class 
analysis is used to separate the sample into different clusters with different ways of interrelating the 
four political attitudes. These clusters are compared in terms of their left- or right-wing ideological 
profile and socio-political background (i.e., populist voting, education, political interest, income levels, 
economic pessimism, and age). Results show that we find four distinct clusters: pluralist populists, anti-
pluralist populists, ambiguous beliefs, and disordered beliefs. Further analyses show that higher levels 
of populist attitudes are related to more right-wing ideological attitudes in each cluster and that higher 
educated and more politically interested respondents belong to the anti-pluralist populist cluster which 
is in line with the supply-definition of populism.  
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Since the 1980’s, the electoral success of right-wing populism has grown in countries like Austria (FPÖ), 
France (FN), the Netherlands (LPF & PVV), Belgium (VB), Switzerland (SVP), Italy (FI & MSS), Denmark 
(DF), and the U.S.A. (Trump). This success has spurred extensive research that aims to identify what 
exactly makes political parties populist. Although the definition of populism is approached in different 
ways (e.g., as discourse, as ideology, as style, as organization) (Canovan, 1999; Weyland, 2001; Mudde, 
2004; Rooduijn, 2013; Moffit and Tormey, 2014; Schoor, 2017; De Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, 
and Stanyer, 2018), most scholars agree on three defining features. 
First, populism consists of a set of beliefs that separate society into ‘the people’ and the political ‘elite’ 
(Mudde, 2004; Deiwiks, 2009; Rooduijn, 2013; Van Kessel, 2014). The elite are depicted as morally 
corrupt, self-serving, and the cause of social suffering because they have no interest in serving the 
people. Second, populist beliefs are in contrast with certain representative democratic beliefs such as 
elitism (i.e., experts are more politically competent than laymen) and pluralism (i.e., decisions are ne-
gotiated between multiple interest groups and with minorities) because these beliefs are perceived to 
stop politicians from acting in accordance with the will of the people (Urbinati, 1998; Mudde, 2004; 
Plattner, 2010; Schulz, Müller, Schemer, Wirz, Wettstein, and Wirth, 2017). Third, populist beliefs are 
ideologically ‘thin’ (Freeden, 1998) as they do not provide answers to most cultural or economic prob-
lems (e.g., migration, income inequality, climate change, etc.). To provide such answers, populist be-
liefs are often attached to a host ideology (e.g., socialism or nativism) which produces a particular 
subtype of populism (e.g., egalitarian or ethnocentric populism) that matches the local socio-political 
context (Taggart, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Deiwiks, 2009; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013; Rooduijn and Ak-
kerman, 2017).  
This definition of populism as a specific set of beliefs is mostly inspired by populism supply research 
which is one of two dominant streams of populism research (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017; Mudde, 
2017; Kaltwasser, 2018). Populism supply research aims to distinguish populist parties from non-pop-
ulist parties by analyzing the prevalence of populist beliefs in speeches, party manifesto’s, and parlia-
mentary voting (Pauwels, 2011; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; Rooduijn et al., 
2017; Schoor, 2017). Alternatively, populism demand research – the focus of this paper – aims to ana-
lyze the prevalence, antecedents, and effects of populist beliefs in the general public (Akkerman, 
Mudde, and Zaslove, 2014; Rooduijn, 2014; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2016; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van 
Droogenbroeck, 2016; Akkerman, Zaslove, and Spruyt, 2017; Schultz et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2018). 
However, current demand research shows several shortcomings. Generally, populism demand re-
search is relatively scarce because populism mostly draws attention to the political parties that use 
populism instead of the general public who supports populism. So, few studies have examined if the 
supply-definition of populism matches the way populism presents itself in the general public. Further, 
research that does focus on the general public often approaches populism by comparing voters of 
populist parties to voters of traditional parties (Akkerman et al., 2014; Rooduijn, 2014; Akkerman et 
al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2018), which limits the study of populism to those instances when populist beliefs 
lead to populist voting. Lastly, although populism is defined as a set of beliefs, demand studies often 
use either a single attitude or a few proxy measures of populism (Elchardus et al., 2016; Spruyt et al., 
2016). Because of these shortcomings, as Mudde (2007, p. 222) and Rooduijn (2014, p. 81) remark, it 
remains largely unknown if the different beliefs that make up populism at the political level also form 
a coherent set of beliefs in the general public.  
In this paper, we conduct an individual-level analysis of populism in the general public by analyzing 
how people themselves combine several political beliefs (i.e., people-centrism, political cynicism, elit-
ism, and pluralism) into their personal political view. For this purpose, we employ a statistical method 
that allows us to partition people into groups based on how they organize their political beliefs – for 
example, how a person’s attitudes towards the political elite are positively or negatively related to 
his/her attitudes towards non-political elite such as intellectuals or entrepreneurs. This approach is 
based on Converse’s (1964) concept of belief systems which refer to different configurations of politi-
cal beliefs. Although people can construct unique belief systems, Converse stresses that society tends 
to have a limited number of general belief systems that are held by different groups of people. By 
approaching populism as a type of belief system, we aim to probe the way populism manifests itself at 
the public level without making a priori assumptions about the dimensionality, prevalence, or subtypes 
of populism. 
This paper contributes to discussions about the definition of populism between supply and demand 
research. While supply research defines populism as a specific set of political beliefs that is adopted by 
political parties to different degrees (e.g., empty populism, anti-elitist populism, excluding populism, 
complete populism) (Jagers et al., 2007) and as different subtypes (e.g., socialist-, nativist-, neo-liberal 
populism) (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; Mudde et al., 2013); demand research often defines popu-
lism as an attitude without further attention to the complexity, type, or degree of populism. We believe 
this is counterproductive given that both research streams assume that political parties use populism 
to attract populist people which also presumes that the type of populism on the supply side matches 
the type of populism on the demand side. By examining what degree or types of populism are present 
in the general public, this study aims to stimulate further integration of supply with demand research. 
II. The supply-definition of populism 
Populism is difficult to define because it manifests itself in different shapes and forms. First, different 
types of populism appear at different places. For example, Europe is familiar with a right-wing nativist 
populism that emphasizes the threat of migration to the traditions and welfare of native citizens; while 
South America is familiar with a left-wing socialist populism that emphasizes the threat of multination-
als and capitalists to the lower and middle classes (Mudde et al., 2013; Panizza, 2013; Rooduijn, 2013). 
Second, populism refers to both a strategy of political parties and a political attitude of the general 
public. Because party-approaches to populism often emphasize characteristics that cannot be seen as 
defining traits of populism at the public level (e.g., charismatic leadership, party organization, simplistic 
rhetoric) (Canovan, 1999; Weyland, 2001; Deiwiks, 2009; Moffit et al., 2014), the definition of populism 
often includes or excludes different beliefs or characteristics depending on the research subject (Van 
Kessel, 2014). 
Because populism manifests itself so differently, scholars have called for a minimal approach to the 
definition of populism by focusing on the features that all (or most) populist parties or politicians have 
in common (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2013). Most scholars settle for three features: (1) populism con-
sists of people-centrist and political cynical beliefs, (2) populism is anti-elitist and anti-pluralist, and (3) 
populism is often associated with other ideologies (e.g., nativist or socialism) but is not defined by 
these ideologies. 
II.1 Core populist beliefs: people-centrism and political cynicism 
So, populism can be defined as a set of beliefs that emphasize the struggle of ‘the common people’ 
against ‘the political elite’. These beliefs reiterate the vertical distinction between the people at the 
bottom and politicians at the top. This distinction is also made normative as the people are depicted 
as hard working, upright citizens who suffer at the hands of corrupt and self-serving politicians (Mudde, 
2004). Populists argue that politicians are unresponsive to people’s needs because their attention is 
drawn towards special interests (e.g., corporations or lobbies) and self-interests (e.g., personal wealth 
or power). Because politicians do not serve the people, populists argue that the people should collec-
tively oppose the political establishment to reinstall ‘the will of the people’ (or ‘common sense’) as the 
legitimate basis for democracy (Mudde, 2004; Mudde et al., 2013).  
Populism also emphasizes that ‘the common people’ and the ‘political elite’ are homogenous catego-
ries (Taggart, 2004; Rooduijn, 2013; Van Kessel, 2014). Although ‘the people’ includes individuals with 
different educations, occupations, ages, and sexes, populists see such differences as irrelevant because 
all common people share oppression and neglect by politicians. In the same sense, politicians are seen 
as homogenously corrupt and deplorable which allows populists to categorically blame politicians for 
people’s different grievances. 
So, by emphasizing the homogeneity of – and the conflict between – the people and politicians, pop-
ulism dichotomizes political thinking into two simplistic beliefs: (1) the belief that ‘the common people’ 
are homogeneously good with a unified will that is the sole legitimate basis for democracy (i.e., people-
centrism) and (2) the belief that politicians are homogenously bad with a unified will to deceive people 
and pursue their own interests (i.e., political cynicism1) (Krouwel and Abts, 2007; Rooduijn, 2013; 
Rooduijn et al., 2017). 
II.2 The populist criticism of liberal representative democracy 
As Urbinati (1998) remarks, “the debate over the meaning of populism turns out to be a debate over 
the interpretation of democracy” (p. 116). Indeed, populism offers a set of beliefs that interpret de-
mocracy as ‘direct majoritarianism’ which stand in contrast to two beliefs on which liberal representa-
tive democracy is based: pluralism and elitism. 
First, pluralism is the belief that society consists of many different groups each with their own interests. 
Given this plurality of interests, politicians should search for compromises between various interests 
(Plattner, 2010). So, contrary to populism, pluralism stresses the heterogeneity of the people without 
establishing normative oppositions between specific groups. Instead of majoritarianism, pluralism 
stresses the protection of minorities through extensive rights and institutions (Urbinati, 1998). So, 
while pluralism favors open discussion and institutional checks and balances to ensure that political 
decisions do not excessively disadvantage minorities, populism argues that liberal checks and balances 
unjustifiably constrain the direct influence of the democratic majority.  
Second, elitism is the belief that educated experts are better suited to make political decisions than 
common people who are uninformed and unexperienced. Instead of direct majoritarianism, elitism 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we use political cynicism to denote negative attitudes towards politicians while we 
use anti-elitism to denote negative attitudes towards non-political elites (e.g., intellectuals, experts, 
etc.). We believe it is important to separate these beliefs given that not all types of populism are une-
quivocally negative towards specific non-political elites.  
 
stresses the importance of experts who mediate popular will into effective policies. Similar to popu-
lism, elitism established a normative distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, but – contrary to 
populism – the elites are depicted as competent and regular people as incompetent (Mudde, 2004; 
Schoor, 2017). So, while elitism argues that experts (e.g., intellectuals, entrepreneurs, etc.) are well-
equipped to advice on how to act in the best interest of society; populism argues that the people 
themselves know what is in the best interest of society.  
Thus Canovan (1999) aptly claims that populism reaffirms democracy’s promise of power to the people 
while, at the same time, attacking the way democracy is pragmatically build up on institutions, laws, 
and experts which limit the direct input of the people. By criticizing liberal representative democracy, 
populism makes clear what it stands for (i.e., people-centrism and political cynicism) and does not 
stand for (i.e., pluralism and elitism) (Mudde, 2004; Schulz et al., 2017). 
II.3 Populism as ‘thin-ideological’ 
As previously mentioned, populism appears in different places as specific subtypes which are both 
similar and different. For instance, left- and right-wing populism share their people-centrism and anti-
elitism, but differ in whom they label as ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Left-wing populism defines ‘the 
people’ as the lower classes who are exploited by corporate greed; while right-wing populism defines 
‘the people’ as the local community that is losing its cultural heritage due to an influx of migrants/ref-
ugees (Mudde et al., 2013; Panizza, 2013; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015; Akkerman et al., 2017). 
Because these subtypes share their populist views but differ in their left or right ideological approach, 
populism is often defined as a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004; Pauwels, 2011; Akkerman et al., 
2014; Akkerman et al., 2017). As Freeden (1998) argues, thin-centered ideologies have a limited set of 
unique views that are insufficient to answer every political question. To overcome this ideological thin-
ness, thin-centered ideologies are attached to a host ideology which covers a broader range of political 
issues. When applied to populism, the idea of a thin-centered ideology allows us to separate left- and 
right-wing populism into its shared populist beliefs and its peripheral host beliefs.  
At its core, populism refers to the belief in a social conflict between the people and the elite. However, 
‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are empty categories that may be used to indicate different groups of peo-
ple (Laclau, 2007). ‘The people’ and ‘the elite’ are given meaning by connecting them to a host ideology 
that establishes a specific social crisis (Taggart, 2004; Moffit et al., 2013; Otjes et al., 2015; Rooduijn et 
al., 2017). For example, left-wing populism uses socialism to define ‘the people’ as the poor based on 
the perception of economic crises caused by capitalists; while right-wing populism uses nativism to 
define ‘the people’ as an ethnic community based on the perception of cultural crises caused by immi-
grants, activists, and intellectuals. In other words, populist ideas become meaningful once they are 
embedded into a broader political worldview that places the populist criticism of the political estab-
lishment at the center of what is going wrong in society.  
Since populism is attached to a range of host ideologies (e.g., socialism, neo-liberalism, nativism) 
(Mudde, 2007), populism should be defined by its core beliefs (i.e., people-centrism, political cynicism, 
anti-elitism, and anti-pluralism) instead of its peripheral host beliefs (e.g., ethnocentrism, authoritari-
anism, welfare chauvinism). 
III The demand-approach: populism as a belief system 
Generally speaking, populism on the supply side of politics is defined as the combination of people-
centrist, political cynical, anti-elitist, and anti-pluralist beliefs (Mudde, 2004; Akkerman et al., 2014; 
Van Kessel, 2014; Schulz et al., 2017). Although defined as a set of four beliefs, not every populist party 
fully adopts all four beliefs. For example, some left-wing populist parties are rather pluralist because 
they tend to embrace the people’s social and cultural diversity; while some right-wing populist parties 
are not as clearly opposed to certain non-political elite (e.g., businessmen, experts, etc.) (Otjes et al., 
2015; Mudde et al., 2013; Panizza, 2013). So, because some parties only partially adopt populism, pre-
vious studies try to capture such instances with concepts like ‘empty populism’ (i.e., people-centrism), 
‘anti-political elite populism’ (i.e., people-centrism combined with political cynicism), and ‘complete 
populism’ (i.e., the combination of people-centrism, political cynicism, anti-elitism, and anti-pluralism) 
(Jagers et al., 2007; Hameleers et al., 2018). 
Although political parties are known to sometimes partially adopt populism, little is known about how 
(or if) the general public also adopts populist beliefs to different extents. This is problematic because 
research further assumes that populism is used by politicians and parties to attract populist voters. If 
the extent to which the public is populist explains populist voting, then more attention should be given 
to how consistently or inconsistently the public supports populist beliefs. In other words, the question 
is if the general public on the demand side of politics combines the same four beliefs into populism as 
predicted by the supply-definition of populism. We approach this question through the notion of belief 
systems.  
III.1 What are belief systems 
Converse (1964) uses belief systems to refer to a systematic way of organizing one’s political beliefs 
into a coherent and logical understanding of politics. As an illustration, Converse compares political 
conservatives to progressives. Although conservatives and progressives disagree on what they believe, 
Converse argues that both groups do agree on how political beliefs are interconnected – that is, both 
expect that people who are conservative (or progressive) on economic issues will also be conservative 
(or progressive) on other issues. In that sense, conservatives and progressives act as polar opposites 
of a single belief system which connects political beliefs in a systematic way. So, the notion of belief 
systems asserts that people’s political beliefs are rarely independent of each other, but are clustered 
into coherent mental systems that make sense of politics.  
However, Converse further argues that the general public possesses several belief systems that differ 
from the political ideologies that govern the political field. Namely, common people are less worried 
than political experts (e.g., politicians) about being ideologically consistent (e.g., conservative or pro-
gressive) towards every political issue. Instead, people with different social identities or obligations 
may have beliefs that seem ideologically contradictory (Converse, 1964). When looking at the general 
public, Converse expects to see a range of belief systems with different ways of interrelating political 
beliefs into configurations that are more or less in line with political ideologies (see figure 1).  





III.2 Investigating populist belief systems 
We argue that populism can be approached as a belief system for two reasons. First, previous studies 
argue that the uniqueness of populism is not situated in a single belief, but in the way populism com-
bines several beliefs (Mudde, 2004; Mudde et al., 2013; Rooduijn, 2013; Rooduijn, 2014; Van Kessel, 
2014). Because the notion of belief systems focus on how people combine political beliefs into coher-
ent systems, we argue that this places the unique quality of populism at the center of analysis. Second, 
approaching populism as a belief system allows us to examine what (sub)types or degrees of populism 
are present in the general public and to compare these to the supply-definition of populism as the 
consistent combination of people centrism, political cynicism, anti-elitism, and anti-pluralism. In this 
way, we are able to assess the conceptual distance between populism at the demand level and popu-
lism at the supply level of politics. 
Based on the supply-definition, populism on the demand side can be expected to present itself as a 
consistently populist belief system in which (1) people-centrism and political cynicism are strongly in-
terrelated – forming the core attitudes of populism – and (2) people-centrism and political cynicism 
                                                          
2 For similar figures see Daenekindt, De Koster, and Van der Waal (2017). 
are negatively associated with elitism and pluralism. This belief system would contain two polar oppo-
sites: populists and non-populists. Because populists and non-populists are part of the same belief 
system, they would agree on how beliefs are connected, but they would disagree on what positions 
they take towards these beliefs – that is, populists would be people-centrist, political cynical, anti-
elitist, and anti-pluralist, while non-populists would be anti people-centrist, anti political cynical, elitist, 
and pluralist.  
However, this consistently populist belief system assumes that the general public is equally concerned 
with consistency as many political parties are on the supply side of politics. If people are less concerned 
with ideological consistency, as Converse (1964) argues, then we expect to see a range of different 
ways of how populist beliefs are combined with non-populist beliefs into a limited number of incon-
sistently populist belief systems (see figure 2). 
H1. Instead of a single populist belief system, the general public contains a number of belief systems 
that differ in their associations between people-centrism, political cynicism, elitism, and pluralism.  






If we expect to find different populist belief systems in the general public, what could explain this 
heterogeneity? We explore two possibilities: (1) people have different left or right ideological beliefs 
that constrain their positions on populist beliefs and/or (2) people have different social backgrounds.  
As previously discussed, populism does not offer a full answer to society’s problems and is often com-
bined with other (host) ideologies. When certain populist beliefs conflict with people’s other ideologi-
cal beliefs, we expect that people could drop the incompatible populist beliefs in favor of their other 
left or right ideological beliefs. For example, a socialist might feel conflicted about adopting anti-plu-
ralist positions while a nativist does not; while both socialists and nativists could easily adopt political 
cynical positions. So, the degree to which people adopt populist beliefs could be affected by people’s 
other ideological beliefs. 
H2. The differences between belief systems are related to differences in left or right ideological atti-
tudes.  
People’s social characteristics could also explain differences between belief systems. As Converse 
(1964) notes, people tend to have more consistent political views when they have a good understand-
ing of politics. So, differences in political interest or education could be a first reason for why people 
have different belief systems. A second reason could be found in people’s sense of social crisis. The 
idea of social crisis is an integral part of populism (Taggart, 2004; Rooduijn, 2013) which attributes 
blame for society’s problems to politicians, non-political elite, and out-groups (Hameleers, Bos, de 
Vreese, 2016; Hameleers and Schmuck, 2017). Therefore, the stronger people believe that society is 
indeed collapsing into crisis, the more likely it could be that people will consistently adopt populist 
views towards politicians, non-political elites, and out-groups/minorities.  
H3. The differences between belief systems are related to differences in perceived social crisis, political 
interest, and education.  
Lastly, we ask what difference it makes if people have different populist belief systems. More specifi-
cally, we are interested in the differences between belief systems in voting for populist parties. Be-
cause we expect that some belief systems will be more consistently populist than others, we also ex-
pect that populist voters will tend to have a more consistently populist belief system compared to non-
populist voters.   
H4. Populist voters are more likely to have a consistently populist belief system compared non-populist 
voters.  
IV Data and methods 
We use data from Flanders (the Dutch speaking part of Belgium) that was commissioned by the Flemish 
government and collected by randomly selecting Dutch-speaking residents from Flanders and Brussels 
who are aged 18 and older. The data was collected in 2016 using computer-assisted personal inter-
views. The survey attained a response rate of 57.20% which produced a sample of 1449 respondents. 
IV.1 Analytical strategy 
In line with others (Daenekindt et al., 2017; Baldassarri and Goldberg, 2014; Dimaggio and Goldberg, 
2018), we use several analytical steps to empirically uncover and describe belief systems in the gen-
eral public.  
First, we use correlational class analysis (CCA) to reveal underlying populist belief systems in our sam-
ple. CCA (Goldberg, 2011; Boutyline, 2017) is a recently developed technique that allows researchers 
to partition a sample into different clusters based on the way respondents interrelate different varia-
bles. By using CCA on a set of items that measure populist and non-populist attitudes, the analysis will 
reveal any number of clusters that have distinctive ways of correlating these items. In other words, 
CCA reveals different clusters of people with maximally different correlation matrices that optimally 
capture real differences in how respondents answered the items. Because CCA currently cannot handle 
missing information, we deleted the respondents with missing values on our core items (i.e., people-
centrism, political cynicism, elitism, and pluralism) which reduces our sample to 1342.  
Second, we look at the differences within each cluster. We use confirmatory factor analysis to investi-
gate how populist beliefs within each cluster are associated with people’s left or right ideological atti-
tudes (i.e., ethnocentrism, gender traditionalism, ecological attitudes). This allows us to describe the 
type of populism in each cluster. Confirmatory factor analysis expresses correlation matrices in linear 
terms in order to specify and test measurement models and relations between latent factors (Brown, 
2006). Because CCA produces clusters with different underlying correlation matrices, we believe con-
firmatory factor analysis is a suitable method to describe and summarize these correlation matrices.  
Third, we look at the differences between clusters with multinomial logistic regressions. More specifi-
cally, we investigate if socio-political characteristics (i.e., sense of crisis, political interest, voting 
choices) and socio-demographic differences (i.e., age, education, and income) explain the observed 
differences between clusters.  
IV.2 Measures 
Populist attitudes. The correlational class analysis is run on four sets of items that measure four dis-
tinct political attitudes. All items are measured using five-point Likert scales, ranging from ‘fully disa-
gree’ to ‘fully agree’ (for more information on these items see Akkerman et al., 2014). 
People-centrism was measured using 4 items: “Politicians need to exclusively follow the will of the 
people”, ”The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions”, “The 
political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the peo-
ple”, and “I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician”.  
Political cynicism was measured using 3 items: “Elected politicians talk too much and take too little 
action”, “What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out one’s principles”, and “Com-
mon people have often been deceived by politicians”. 
Elitism was measured using 3 items: “Our country would be governed better if important decisions 
were left up to successful business people”, “Our country would be governed better if important deci-
sions were left up to independents experts”, and “Our society is so complex that important decisions 
should be made by non-political professionals”.  
Pluralism was measured using 4 items: “In a democracy it is important to make compromises 
among differing viewpoints”, “It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups”, “Freedom de-
pends on how diversity is accepted”, and “No opinion is incontestable. That is why it is good to consider 
different opinions”. 
 
Ideological attitudes. We use three sets of items to measure people’s ideological orientation, using 5-
point Likert items. 
Ethnocentrism refers to people’s negative attitudes towards immigrants and was measured using 
four items: “In general, immigrants cannot be trusted”, “Immigrants exploit our social security system”, 
“The presence of different cultures enriches our society”3, and “Immigrants threaten our culture and 
traditions”. 
Gender traditionalism refers to people’s attitudes towards traditional gender roles and was meas-
ured using 8 items: “Ironing clothes is a task for both men and women”3, “Women are more suited to 
raise children than men”, “Getting a good education is less important for girls than boys”, “Washing 
the dishes is a task for both men and women”3, “Boys can be raised with more freedom than girls”, “It 
is unnatural if a woman supervises men at the workplace”, “Men are more suited to replace a flat tire 
than women”, and “Men and women are equally suited to raise children”3. 
Ecological attitudes refer to people’s attitude towards social attention to ecological problems and 
was measured using 5 items: “Most ecological problems in Flanders are exaggerated” 3, “I rarely worry 
about pollution in Flanders” 3, “Talking about pollution in Flanders makes people more worried than 
necessary” 3, “Nowadays, we worry too much about the environment and not enough about prices and 




                                                          
3 Was reverse coded. 
Socio-political variables. We use three socio-political characteristics. 
Party voting was measured by the following question: “If elections would be held next Sunday, for 
which political party would you vote?”. Answers were coded into two categories: populist radical right 
voters (8.7%) and other voters (i.e., other parties and independents) (91.3%).  
Political interest was measured in two ways. First, respondents were asked to indicate how inter-
ested they are in politics on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘totally not interested’ to ‘very inter-
ested’. Second, respondents answered 4 items using 5-point Likert scales ranging from ‘fully disagree’ 
to ‘fully agree’. The statements were: “I know more about politics than most people I know”, “I usually 
have an opinion when people talk about politics”, “I don’t understand most political topics”3, “Some-
times politics seem so complex that people like me don’t understand what’s going on”3. We combined 
these items into a mean-scale with higher scores indicating more political interest (M=1.97; SD= 0.89; 
Range= 0-4; Cronbach’s α = 0.851).  
Economic pessimism captures people’s level of pessimism about the state of economic wellbeing 
and inequality in the near future. We use economic pessimism as a measure of people’s perception of 
a developing social-economic crisis. Five items are used: “In 10 years there will be more unemployed 
in Flanders”, “In 10 years people will have to take care of their own pensions”, “In 10 years the number 
of socially excluded people will have increased”, “In 10 years the next generation will have a lower 
income”, “In 10 years the gap between the highest and the lowest incomes will be larger”. We com-
bined these items into a mean-scale with higher scores indicating more pessimism (M= 2.61; SD= 0.54; 
Range=0.8-4; Cronbach’s α = 0.685). 
 
Socio-demographics. We include age (in years), education (as ‘no and lower education’, ‘secondary 
education’, and ‘higher education’), and people’s self-reported comfort with their current income (as 




V.1 Four populist belief systems 
The CCA was performed4 on 14 items that measure people-centrism, political cynicism, elitism, and 
pluralism. The analysis found four distinct clusters, representing 41.43%, 19.32%, 22.48%, and 16.77% 
of the sample. Each cluster represents a distinct way of interrelating attitudes into a belief system. We 
visualize each cluster as a network to facilitate a straightforward interpretation of the differences be-
tween clusters (see figure 3). In each network, nodes embody items while edges represent correla-
tions. The width and shape of the edges depend on the strength and direction of the correlations: 
wider (narrower) edges represent stronger (weaker) correlations while dashed (full) edges show neg-
ative (positive) correlations (see appendix for full correlation matrices). Only significant correlations 
are shown (p ≤ 0.05).  
The networks show several differences between clusters. We discuss the important differences by 
looking at three traits: (1) the strength of association between people-centrism and political cynicism, 
(2) the association of pluralism to people-centrism and political cynicism, and (3) the association of 
elitism to people-centrism and political cynicism.  
First, the clusters differ in how strongly people-centrism and political cynicism are interrelated. While 
both attitudes are strongly interrelated in cluster 1 and 2 as shown by the high correlations between 
the items, people-centrism and political cynicism are fairly disconnected in cluster 3 and 4 into sepa-
rate constructs as shown by the lower correlations. In other words, the results show clear evidence of 
a latent populist construct that constrains people’s people-centrist and political cynical attitudes in 
cluster 1 and 2 while these attitudes are less constrained in cluster 3 and 4.  
                                                          
4 Using the ‘corclass’ (Boutyline, 2016) and ‘qgraph’ (Epskamp, Cramer, Waldorp, Schmittermann, and Bors-
boom, 2012) packages in R.  
Second, contrary to the supply-definition of populism, most clusters do not show negative associations 
of pluralism to people-centrism and political cynicism. Instead, cluster 3 and 4 show rather weak or 
conflicting (i.e., both positive and negative) associations. Especially in cluster 3, pluralism is largely 
disassociated from other attitudes. In contrast, pluralism is strongly associated to other attitudes in 
cluster 1 and 2. More specifically, cluster 1 shows positive associations of pluralism to people-centrism 
and political cynicism, while cluster 2 shows negative associations. In other words, only cluster 2 shows 
the expected negative relationship of pluralism to people-centrism and political cynicism.  
Third, also contrary to the supply-definition of populism, none of the clusters display the expected 
negative association of elitism to people-centrism and political cynicism. Instead, all correlations are 
positive which shows that respondents with a more negative attitude towards politicians tend to be 
more positive towards non-political elite. So, because people’s elitism does not differentiate between 
clusters, elitism does not give us further insight into different (sub)types of populism in our sample. 
Instead, all four clusters show that, generally speaking, higher levels of people-centrism and/or politi-
cal cynicism are associated with more positive attitudes towards businesspeople, experts, and non-
political professionals.  
Based on these considerations, we label cluster 1 as a pluralist populist belief system and cluster 2 as 
an anti-pluralist populist belief system because both clusters have a strong integration of core populist 
attitudes (i.e., people-centrism and political cynicism) but show a different association between these 
core populist attitudes and pluralist attitudes. Again, we do not claim that every person in cluster 1 
and 2 is populist, but that the people within each cluster agree on how populist attitudes are related 
to pluralist attitudes. While cluster 1 and 2 show that people with a strong integration of populist 
attitudes also have a clear position towards pluralism, cluster 3 shows that people with a low integra-
tion of populist attitudes are uncertain about their position towards pluralism. In that sense, cluster 3 
can be termed as an ambiguous belief system because people in cluster 3 are more likely to combine 
populist attitudes with non-populist attitudes without a clear association of these populist and non-
populist attitudes to pluralist attitudes. Lastly, people-centrist and political cynical attitudes are less 
integrated in cluster 4 and are inconsistently associated with elitism and pluralism – that is, pluralist 
attitudes are slightly negatively associated with people-centrist attitudes and positively associated 
with political cynical attitudes, while elitist attitudes are positively associated with political cynical at-
titudes but not associated with people-centrist attitudes. Because there is no obvious logic or order 
that governs these relations, we term it as an disordered belief system.  
Thus, as expected (H1), the analysis uncovers several distinct belief systems with different ways of 
interrelating people-centrist, political cynical, elitist, and pluralist items. Although, none of the four 
belief systems fully matches the supply-definition of populism, the anti-pluralist populist cluster (clus-
ter 2) comes close as it contains (1) a strong relation between people-centrism and political cynicism 
and (2) a negative association of pluralism to people-centrism and political cynicism. In that sense, we 
label the anti-pluralist populist cluster as a more consistently populist cluster (i.e., more in line with 
the ideological consistency of populism as emphasized in supply research) while we label the pluralist 
populist, ambiguous, and disordered clusters as less consistently populist clusters. Next, we assess 




























V.2 Belief systems and ‘host’ ideological attitudes 
We use confirmatory factor analysis to investigate if higher levels of populist attitudes within each 
cluster are related to higher levels of left- or right-wing ideological attitudes. In this way, we examine 
if each cluster incorporates a different subtype of populism or if all clusters are variants of either left- 
or right-wing populism. In order to simplify the analysis, we limit each cluster to its core populist atti-
tudes (i.e., people-centrism and political cynicism) which we relate to three ideological attitudes: eth-
nocentrism, gender traditionalism, and ecological attitudes (see appendix for structural model). 
Contrary to expectations (H2), our results show that the observed differences between clusters are 
not embedded in broader ideological differences. Instead of containing a specific subtype of populism, 
each cluster contains a variant of right-wing populism (see table 1). In each cluster, we observe that 
higher levels of people-centrism or political cynicism are related to more ethnocentrism, more gender 
traditionalism, and less positive ecological attitudes. Although we see some differences between clus-
ters in magnitude and significance of the estimated correlations, we find no evidence that some clus-
ters have a different ideological profile than others (see appendix for item loadings).  
In line with the CCA network visualizations, the results also show a higher association between people-
centrism and political cynicism in the pluralist populist and anti-pluralist populist belief systems com-
pared to the ambiguous and disordered belief systems. The highest correlation between people-cen-
trism and political cynicism as latent attitudes is found in the pluralist populist cluster (r = 0.937), fol-
lowed by the anti-pluralist populist cluster (r = 0.930), the ambiguous cluster (r = 0.576), and the dis-
ordered cluster (r = 0.559). This again confirms that one important difference between clusters is the 
level of constraint between people-centrism and political cynicism. In the pluralist populist and anti-
pluralist populist belief systems, respondent’s level of people-centrism is very informative about their 
level of political cynicism; while these attitudes are less connected in the ambiguous and disordered 







V.3 Social differences between belief systems 
Lastly, we inspect the differences in socio-political background between the four clusters. First, we 
examine the relation between cluster membership and voting for a populist radical right (PRR) party. 
The cross-tabulation (table 2) shows that PRR voters are more likely to be the pluralist populist cluster 
and less likely to be in the anti-pluralist populist cluster. This suggests that PRR voters tend see populist 
attitudes in line with pluralist attitudes.  
Second, we analyze the association between cluster membership and several social characteristics. In 
order to do this, we use multinomial logistic regressions with the four clusters as dependent variable 
(see table 3). Model 1 only includes the effect of PRR voting, while model 2 includes all socio-political 
and socio-demographic characteristics.  
Model 1 confirms the pattern observed in the cross-tabulation. The odds of belonging to the pluralist 
populist cluster compared to the anti-pluralist populist cluster are 3.13 (𝑒1.142) times higher for PRR 
voters compared to non-PRR voters. The same conclusion holds for the ambiguous cluster: the odds 
of belonging to the ambiguous cluster compared to the anti-pluralist populist cluster are 2.17 (𝑒0.774) 
times higher for PRR voters compared to non-PRR voters. In other words, PRR voters are more likely 
to be pluralist populist or ambiguous than anti-pluralist populist. This is contrary to expectations (H4) 
as the result show that PRR voters are more likely to belong the less consistently populist belief sys-
tems (i.e., pluralist populists and ambiguous belief systems) than the more consistently populist be-
lief system (i.e., anti-pluralist populists).  
Next, the results of model 2 show that the effects of PRR voting disappear once we control for other  
characteristics. In general, we find significant effects of political interest, economic pessimism, and 
education. Respondents who are more pessimistic about the future state of the economy are more 
likely to be pluralist populist (odds ratio = 𝑒0.628 = 1.874), ambiguous (odds ratio = 𝑒0.599 = 1.820), and 
disordered (odds ratio = 𝑒0.604 = 1.829) compared to anti-pluralist populist. Political interest also dif-
ferentiates between clusters: respondents who are more interested in politics are less likely to be plu-
ralist populist (odds ratio = 𝑒−0.364 = 0.695) and ambiguous (odds ratio = 𝑒−0.299 = 0.742) compared to 
anti-pluralist populist. Education has a similar effect on cluster membership: those with lower or sec-
ondary education are more likely to be pluralist populist (odds ratio = 𝑒0.804 = 2.235; odds ratio = 𝑒0.813 
= 2.256) and ambiguous (odds ratio = 𝑒0.837 = 2.309; odds ratio = 𝑒0.647 = 1.910) compared to anti-
pluralist populist. Lastly, we find no effects on cluster membership of age and the self-reported level 
of comfort with current income levels. 
These results partially confirm our expectations (H3). In line with expectations, less educated and po-
litically interested respondents are more likely to belong to more inconsistently populist belief systems 
(i.e., pluralist populist and ambiguous) than more consistently populist belief systems (i.e., anti-plural-
ist populist). Contrary to expectations, we do not find that respondents who have a larger sense of 
social crisis (as measured by economic pessimism) tend to have more consistently populist belief sys-
tems. Instead, more pessimist respondents are more likely to be pluralist populist, ambiguous, and 











VI. Discussion  
In this article, we approach populism as a type of belief system. We explore this idea by applying a new 
statistical technique which is able to describe the heterogeneity in how individuals combine and or-
ganize their political attitudes. Our analysis discovers four distinct belief systems in the populist atti-
tudes of the general public which allows us to make a number of conclusions.  
Although populism is often defined as a consistent set of political beliefs, we find that the general 
public shows more inconsistency in their populist beliefs. On the one hand, people differ in the extent 
to which they interrelate people-centrism with political cynicism. Two of the belief systems show a 
moderate association between people-centrism and political cynicism (39.3% of sample), while the 
other two belief systems show a strong association (60.7% of sample). On the other hand, pluralism 
clearly differentiates between the four belief systems. For those with a strong association between 
people-centrism and political cynicism, pluralism is either positively associated with people-centrism 
and political cynicism (i.e., pluralist populist belief system) or negatively associated with people-cen-
trism and political cynicism (i.e., anti-pluralist populist belief system). For those with a moderate asso-
ciation between people-centrism and political cynicism, pluralism is either not associated with people-
centrism and political cynicism (i.e., ambiguous belief system) or inconsistently associated with people-
centrism and political cynicism (i.e., disordered belief system). In other words, the more clearly people 
understand populism as a coherent combination of people-centrism with political cynicism, the more 
clearly people also understand how populist beliefs relate to pluralist beliefs. So, while pluralism and 
populism are perceived as contradictory in populism literature (Urbinati, 1998; Mudde, 2004; Plattner, 
2010; Mudde et al., 2013; Schulz et al., 2017), we find only limited evidence that populism and plural-
ism are seen as contradictory beliefs by the general public. Lastly, we find that elitism does not differ-
entiate between the four belief systems. Each belief system shows that people with negative attitudes 
towards political elite tend to be more positive towards non-political elite and vice versa (for similar 
results see Akkerman et al., 2014). 
The differences between the four belief systems are not related to left- or right-wing ideological atti-
tudes, but are related to social characteristics. More specifically, the results show that higher levels of 
people-centrism and/or political cynicism are related to more ethnocentrism, more gender tradition-
alism, and less positive ecological attitudes in each of the four belief systems. So, each belief system 
displays the ideological profile of (radical) right-wing populism (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002; 
Mudde et al., 2013; Akkerman, 2015; Mudde, 2017; Akkerman et al., 2017; Schulz et al., 2017). How-
ever, the belief systems do differ in their average levels of education, political interest, and economic 
pessimism. Most interestingly, people with a higher education and more interest in politics were more 
likely to have an anti-pluralist populist belief system compared to a pluralist populist or ambiguous 
belief system. In line with Converse (1964), this suggests that the supply-definition of populism as a 
consistently populist system of beliefs mostly holds up for people who are higher educated and inter-
ested in politics.  
The results further suggest that populist radical right (PRR) voters are most likely to have a pluralist 
populist belief system. So, in support of previous research (Akkerman et al., 2014; Akkerman et al., 
2017), this confirms that people who strongly associate people-centrism with political cynicism are 
more likely to vote for populist parties. However these pluralist populist PRR voters are also likely to 
combine populism with ethnocentrism and pluralism. This suggests that pluralism might have a very 
specific meaning for pluralist populists in which pluralism is perceived as applicable to specific groups 
and not to other groups (e.g., migrants). However, this question is beyond the scope of this study and 
should be addressed in future research.  
In conclusion, in this article we argue that demand research on populism should focus on individual-
level analyses of populist attitudes in the general public in order to bridge the conceptual distance 
between demand and supply research. We explored one way of how this can be done by focusing on 
populism as a belief system. Consistent with supply research, we find evidence of different degrees of 
populism (i.e., less integrated vs. strongly integrated, pluralist populism vs. anti-pluralist populism) 
(Jagers et al., 2007), a peripheral host ideology (i.e., right-wing nativism) (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; 
Mudde et al., 2013), and a strong integration of people-centrism with political cynicism (Rooduijn, 
2013). Contrary to supply research (Urbinati, 1998; Mudde, 2004; Plattner, 2010), we find that popu-
lism was positively associated with attitudes towards non-political elite and could be positively, nega-
tively, and not associated with pluralism. Thus, we find that the set of beliefs that is generally defined 
as populism on the supply side of politics only partially matches the sets of beliefs that make up pop-
ulism in the general public.  
As our study reveals both similarities and differences between how populism is approached in supply 
research and how populism manifests itself in the general public, future research should consider the 
following questions.  
Previous research stresses that radical right populists often combine anti-migration positions with eco-
nomic egalitarian positions (De Koster, Achterberg, Van der Waal, 2012; Norocel, 2016). However, our 
data does not include economic attitudes such as: economic individualism, egalitarianism, and welfare 
attitudes. Future research should use both cultural and economic attitudes to further inspect the prev-
alence of different (ideological) types of populism in the general public.  
We interpret the differences between belief systems in education, political interest, and economic 
pessimism as evidence for Converse’s (1964) idea that people with different social positions tend to 
have different belief systems. However, an alternative explanation could be that certain belief systems 
contain people that are more populist than those in other belief systems. Because people with higher 
levels of populist attitudes tend to be less educated, less involved with politics, and more pessimistic 
(Elchardus et al., 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016), future research should try to control between cluster dif-
ferences (i.e., associations between attitudes) for within cluster differences (i.e., level of attitudes). 
However, currently there is no statistical procedure in correlational class analysis that allows this.  
Lastly, this paper explores the prevalence of populist belief systems in the context of a single West-
European country. Given that the largest differences in populist (sub)types are observed between dif-
ferent socio-political contexts (e.g., South America vs. Europe), future research should aim to apply 
this individual-level analysis of populist attitudes on cross-national data in order to examine the con-
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